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Abstract:   
We consider a possible determinant of regulatory decisions by public utility commissioners: the desire to 
remain in office.  We examine regulatory exit, where a regulator leaves a commission during a term or is 
not re-appointed/re-elected. With data from US states, we empirically investigate several hypotheses 
motivated by a political agency model of regulatory decision-making. Our empirical results generally 
support the hypotheses, including that higher electricity prices lead to ousting, that ousting is less common 
where it is more costly for the principal to whom the regulator reports, and that ousting is more likely 
where regulators are more accountable or are more likely to share the principal‘s preferences.  Furthermore, 
the results provide limited evidence that regulatory exit is not due mainly to the revolving door. Ousting 
also appears to lower future electricity prices. 
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  1 
I. Introduction 
Regulatory agencies have played an important role in network industries for 
almost a century in the U.S., and regulatory authorities often argue that their 
independence is a crucial aspect of their design.
1
  Regulators, however, do not make 
decisions in a vacuum.  We look at whether regulators have incentive to align their 
decisions with the preferences of those who appoint or elect them, or whether their 
decisions are independent of such influence.  That is, does political pressure discipline 
regulators?  We examine the tenure of state public utility commissioners and regulated 
electricity prices to address both meanings of ―discipline‖.  First, are non-reappointment, 
non-reelection, and political pressure to leave office before a term is up used to punish 
regulators who contradict the preferences of the appointing or electing body?  Such 
punishment we refer to collectively as ―ousting‖.  Furthermore, does ousting regulators 
discipline their replacements, in the sense that future regulatory decisions are more in line 
with the preferences of the electorate or the governor?   We demonstrate econometrically 
that ousting is of empirical significance in both questions.  We contribute to the political 
economy literature on regulation by showing that in the absence of incentive-pay 
contracts, which are usually not possible to offer to state regulators,
2
 ousting appears to 
be another mechanism used to motivate and restrain regulators.   The results are also of 
                                                 
1
 For example, in its regulatory guide for foreign regulators, the FCC states that ―Establishing an 
independent regulatory authority is a crucial factor in the success of any country‘s effort to introduce 
competition and to privatize and liberalize the telecommunications sector‖ 
(http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/sec1.html, visited July 1, 2010). 
2
 The pay of regulators is typically determined by the legislature, sometimes directly and elsewhere by 
pegging commissioner salaries to that of other public positions (e.g., in Maine the salary of commissioners 
is equal to that of an Associate Justice of the Superior Court; Maine Rev. Stat. §6-A). One exception is that 
in some states the governor determines which commissioner serves as chair, and the position of chair 
commands a higher salary (e.g., in Maine the salary of the chair is equal to that of the Chief Justice of the 
Superior Court).  No state determines the pay of PUC commissioners based directly on their regulatory 
decisions, and in some states there are explicit statutory restrictions on receiving any compensation other 
than salary and travel expenses for serving as a commissioner.   
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practical interest to policymakers concerned about the independence of regulatory 
decision-making. 
Ousting is related to both prominent explanations in the political economy 
literature for regulatory decision-making: public choice theory and capture theory (or 
more broadly in the latter case, the economic theory of regulation).  Public choice 
theories look at the role of constituents‘ preferences in shaping regulatory outcomes.  
Public choice theory indicates that institutions for choosing regulators are important, and 
many studies have looked at whether elected regulators are more pro-consumer than are 
those appointed by governors and legislatures.
3
  Boyes & McDowell (1989) summarize 
the early literature (e.g., Costello, 1984) as finding no consistent pattern of elections 
leading to pro-consumer outcomes.  Later work by Besley and Coate (2003), however, 
finds convincing evidence that electing officials leads to lower prices and less pass 
through of costs to electricity rates.
4
    
Instead of following the literature in looking only at the determinants of regulated 
prices, our work takes ousting as the main phenomenon to explain, thus providing an 
explanation for why regulators might make good on their promises.  In the public choice 
approach to regulation, the mechanism by which a past appointment or election translates 
into current regulatory behavior is typically not modeled explicitly.  It is either assumed, 
as in Downsian public choice models,
5
 that regulatory candidates can pre-commit to 
policies, or that the regulator‘s type (and hence future actions) is known (see Besley and 
                                                 
3
 Such studies are but one strand of the large literature looking at the determinants of regulatory decisions.  
See Dal Bó (2006) for a review.  
4
 Elections matter through less-direct channels as well.  Guerriero (2006) finds evidence that when states 
switch to electing the administrative law judges that can overturn regulatory decisions, less cost is passed 
through to consumers of regulated services. 
5
 Downs (1957) shows that when politicians are able to commit to policies, their choices satisfy the 
preferences of the median voter.  
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Coate (2003) for a model incorporating the latter assumption).  In neither case is it clear 
why the regulator should be viewed as an automaton acting in a predetermined, 
predictable way once in office.  This assumption is not innocuous, because once in office 
the regulator‘s incentives may change.  The choice to support a particular policy before 
serving office may be dynamically inconsistent.  For example, to be elected, a candidate 
for a public utility commission (PUC) may promise to lower electricity prices for 
consumers, but once in office may find that supporting higher prices will secure better 
post-commission employment from the regulated industry.  Alesina (1988) shows that 
lack of commitment causes the predictions of Downsian models to break down when 
voters are forward looking and rational. 
Our work explores an explanation for why regulators might follow through on 
their promises, even in the absence of binding commitments to platforms:  regulators care 
about keeping their positions and act to please those who have the power to terminate 
them.
6
  Our approach is thus similar in spirit to the ―retention rule‖ literature based on 
Holmstrom‘s career concerns model (Banks and Sundaram, 1998; Ashworth, 2005).7  By 
accepting a seat on a PUC, a commissioner occupies a highly political position, exposed 
to pressure from the governor, the legislature, voters, and special interest groups (Schuler, 
1996), and ousting is not an idle threat.  In some cases, ousting of regulators is public and 
dramatic.  For example, in 2006, the Maryland legislature attempted to remove all of the 
state‘s public service commissioners by dissolving the commission after a regulatory 
decision that greatly increased retail electricity prices.  For every public ousting of a 
commissioner, there are probably far more cases in which back-channel pressure from the 
                                                 
6
 We do not suggest that regulators have this as their only goal, merely that it is one factor (perhaps among 
many) that may have empirical relevance. 
7
 Unlike in these models, the regulator in our model does not undertake costly actions to reveal his type. 
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governor‘s office or a sense that the electorate is unhappy with regulatory performance 
causes commissioners to seek other employment ―voluntarily‖ or to decline to run for 
another term. 
The other main economic approach to explain regulatory decision-making is 
capture theory, which argues against allowing complete regulatory independence.
8
  Both 
capture theory (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974) and its expanded version, interest group 
theory (Peltzman, 1976), assume that industry can pay off regulators in order to influence 
outcomes toward industry.
9
  Such payments include ―revolving door‖ offers of post-
regulatory employment in the regulated industry,
10
 which is widespread (Eckert, 1981).
11
  
The empirical literature on capture theory regarding whether the revolving door leads to 
pro-industry regulatory decisions is mixed (Cohen, 1986; Dal Bó, 2006), and there is 
apparently no recent evidence from the energy industry.
12
  Nonetheless, given the 
potential empirical relevance of capture theory for regulatory performance, any public 
choice theory of regulation ignoring capture theory is incomplete.  We explore the 
implications of capture theory as an alternative explanation for ousting in our empirical 
                                                 
8
 See Boehm (2007) for a guided survey of the literature on capture as it applies to regulation. 
9
 Industry can also offer the stick instead of the carrot to keep regulators in line by protesting regulatory 
decisions.  Leaver (2009) finds evidence to support that regulators seek to minimize industry ―squawking‖ 
to enhance their reputation and post-commission employment prospects.   Industry can also shape 
regulatory outcomes by channeling campaign contributions to the state legislators who appoint or confirm 
regulators (de Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007). 
10
 Che (1995) points out that the revolving door may also take subtler forms such as consulting 
arrangements with the regulated firm after the commissioner steps down from the PUC. 
11
 A former advisor at the FCC states that in the federal context, the revolving door (from a regulatory 
agency to the regulated industry) is ―a problem much bigger than the FCC and it‘s all around town.‖ 
(Curran, 2009).   
12
 The revolving door remains of current policy interest.  Upon attaining office, President Obama imposed 
new restrictions on lobbying by senior level government and regulatory appointees after they leave public 
service.  Commissioners who leave the FCC (for example) are now barred for two years from appearing 
before the Commission (twice as long as before) and are indefinitely barred from lobbying FCC officials 
(Buskirk and Bender, 2009). 
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investigation.  Our empirical work thus adds to the large body of econometric work 
testing the implications of the economic theory of regulation (interest group theory).
13
 
To explore the link between regulatory decisions and ousting, we examine the 
impact that pricing decisions have on regulators‘ tenure with a simple model of political 
agency.  That is, we look at whether prices that are out of line with the preferences of the 
political master of the regulator (the principal) lead to ousting.  We assume that the 
principal prefers lower to higher prices, after controlling for generation cost.  We also 
assume that the cost of ousting is lower for governors.  When regulators are appointed, 
they must please not only the median voter (who elects the regulators‘ masters) but also 
the master (governor‘s office or legislature) itself.  The theory also indicates that ousting 
will be more common when the regulator holds preferences that are farther from those of 
the governor or voters and when accountability for individual regulators is higher. 
In the empirical model, we take the theory to the data to test various hypotheses 
suggested by the theoretical model.  We proceed by finding regressors that proxy for 
various parameters in the theoretical model.  The regression estimates reveal interesting 
patterns in the data and provide evidence in support of the political economy model as an 
explanation for ousting.  The empirical work also points toward—but does not prove 
that— politically motivated ousting causes regulatory exit more by than capture does. 
Our exploration relies on an exhaustive dataset of state public utility regulators from 
1970 to 2005, including dates of service, whether the regulators completed their terms, 
and whether they were reappointed or reelected.  The regulatory decisions we focus on 
are retail electricity prices.  Other variables such as generation costs, the political 
                                                 
13
 See section 3 of Noll (1989) for citations. 
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proclivities of the regulators‘ superiors (the party of the governor and an ideological 
score for voters), and the status of deregulation in each state also are included.
14
 
In the econometric examination of the data, we analyze mid-term ousting with a 
hazard rate model of the regulators‘ tenure, and analyze the outcome at time of re-
appointment/re-election with a binary dependent variable model.  Results suggest that 
ousting is not an empty threat:  turnover of commissioners is higher when regulatory 
commissioners allow higher prices, both for mid-term ousting and at time of re-
appointment/re-election.  Ousting may therefore be a mechanism to punish regulators 
who step out of line, and the degree of independence that regulators enjoy is thus open to 
question.
15
  Electricity prices for industrial customers, who face lower costs to mount 
political pressure than do general consumers, have a larger impact on ousting than do 
standard retail rates.   
Turning to political economy variables, we find that mid-term ousting is more 
prevalent where regulators are appointed and where the governor has strong power to 
remove commissioners unilaterally.  Regulatory tenure is shorter where the median voter 
is more liberal and where there is a greater difference between the ideology of the median 
voter and the commissioner.  Ousting is more common when the commissioner is in the 
majority party on the PUC or is a member of a smaller PUC, both of which make a 
commissioner more accountable for outcomes.  All of these results are in accord with the 
political agency model.  Furthermore, most of these factors also decrease the likelihood 
                                                 
14
 The present paper builds on the work of Jamison, Hauge, and Chiang (2009), who use similar data on 
regulators to examine determinants of commissioners leaving office before their terms expire.  Our work 
differs by looking at individual commissioners instead of aggregating to the state level, examining re-
appointments and re-elections, and placing the empirical results in the context of a theoretical model.  
15
 Our work does not address the optimal degree of regulatory independence.  We discuss this in our 
concluding section. 
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of the commissioner serving another term.  In addition, commissioners who were not 
appointed by the current governor and those whose party affiliation does not match that 
of the governor are also less likely to serve again, results that are again consistent with 
the model. 
To explore capture theory as an alternative explanation of why we might see 
regulators leaving office after what could be perceived as a pro-industry decision (as 
Cohen (1986) found), we also explore the impact of restrictions on post-regulatory 
employment.   We find that regulatory tenure is shorter where there are such employment 
restrictions, which points toward ousting and away from capture as the explanation for 
the observed exit of commissioners.  A suite of robustness tests lends further support to 
the conclusion that the political economy of regulation determines ousting. 
In the final part of our study, we address the deterrent effect of ousting by 
considering whether the ousting of regulators lowers future electricity prices.  Our results 
show that there appears to be a curbing effect from punishing regulators by ousting:  
subsequent electricity prices are lower than they otherwise would be.  While the 
magnitude of the effect is not large, the result is robust to several changes in specification. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section II, we review a model of political 
agency.  In section III, we describe our data, link the empirical model to the theoretical 
model, and formulate hypotheses to test.  In section IV, we present our econometric 
models for ousting and the regulatory determination of prices.  In section V, we present 
our empirical results.  In a concluding section we discuss avenues that our results open 
for future work on the optimal degree of regulatory independence.  An appendix contains 
some details of the econometric model not presented in the main text. 
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II. Theoretical Considerations  
To motivate the econometric work and to assist in interpreting the empirical 
results, in this section we briefly describe a model of political agency from Besley (2006).  
Instead of taking a typical mechanism design approach in which the principal offers 
incentive pay or budgetary contracts to the regulator, we choose a model in which the 
principal‘s only instrument is to oust the agent, which is more realistic for our application. 
While the original context of Besley‘s model is a game between voters and an elected 
politician, we apply it more generally to describe the regulatory process.  Consider a two 
period game between a principal, which may be the state‘s governor or voters (i.e., the 
median voter) and the agent, the regulator.  The agent‘s task is to perform an unobserved 
action, which we take to be setting the markup of utility prices p over cost.  The action, in 
conjunction with the state of nature (also unobserved by the principal), determines the 
principal‘s payoff.  There are two types of regulators, congruent and dissonant.  
Congruent regulators, who compose proportion π of the pool of potential regulators, hold 
preferences identical to the principal‘s, who wants prices to move with cost.  Dissonant 
regulators earn a random, period-specific rent r from acting contrary to the principal‘s 
wishes and raises prices out of line with cost.  Both types of regulators benefit from 
staying in office, however.  The principal‘s task is to decide after observing its utility in 
period one whether to oust the regulator.   
In Besley‘s model, ousting when the prices are out of line with the principal‘s 
preferences is part of an ―oust the louse‖ perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  In the second 
period, both types of agents act in their short-term interest.  For the dissonant type, this 
leads to an outcome that the principal does not wish—prices that are high relative to cost, 
in our interpretation.  Therefore, the principal screens agents on whether they acted 
Hauge, Jamison, and Prieger  Oust the Louse 
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congruently in period one.  Good behavior leads to re-appointment or re-election, and bad 
behavior leads to ousting and another draw of a regulator for period two.  A dissonant 
type acts congruently in period one only if his draw of dissonance rent in period one is 
too small to make forgoing the expected benefits of holding office in period two 
worthwhile.
16
  We make one conceptual addition to Besley‘s model.  If the principal 
incurred a random utility cost with mean θ when ousting the agent, then the amount of 
ousting observed in replications of the game would be decreasing in θ.   
III. Data and Hypotheses 
In this section, we describe our data and posit several hypotheses concerning the 
relationships between ousting on the one hand and prices and the political characteristics 
of the regulatory setting on the other hand.  We also present an alternative hypothesis that 
helps distinguish between ousting and the revolving door as the explanation for regulators 
leaving office.  
Our data includes information on all US state public utility commissioners from 
1970 through 2005.  We collected information including starting dates for each term, 
statutory and actual term ending dates, method of selection (election or appointment),
17
 
and the political party of the commissioner.  These data are from NARUC,
18
 Beecher 
(2007), and various PUC web sites.
19
  The party affiliation of the commissioner is 
                                                 
16
 See section 3.3 of Besley (2006) for the mathematical details of the model. 
17
 In S. Carolina and Virginia, the legislature elects the PUC commissioners. We count commissioners from 
S. Carolina and Virginia as elected instead of appointed.  The members of the Tennessee Regulatory 
Authority are appointed by the governor, the lieutenant governor, and the Speaker of the House, and we 
count them as appointed. The members of the D.C. Public Service Commission are appointed by the mayor.  
In all other cases of appointment, the principal is the governor. 
18
 The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) published annual lists of 
commissioners on every US PUC in its Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation (1973-1990), and 
Profiles of Regulatory Agencies of the United States and Canada: Yearbook (1991-1996). 
19
 Additional data on the party affiliation of regulators was obtained from Joe Craig, who collected the data 
for Craig (2009). 
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missing for about 6% of the observations, and so we estimate models with and without 
controlling for party.  We include all commissioners that were serving in 1970 or started 
terms thereafter.  States generally have three to five commissioners serving concurrently, 
usually with overlapping terms, although some seats may be vacant at any given time.  In 
13 states, commissioners are elected during the entire sample period,
20
 and in four others, 
they are elected at the beginning of the sample but appointed by the end.
21
  The length of 
service varies significantly both within a state and across states depending on statutory 
length of term, how often commissioners are re-appointed or re-elected, and how often 
commissioners leave office before their terms end.  We analyze all states and Washington, 
D.C. over 35 years, giving us complete observations on 1,164 commissioners who 
collectively serve 1,816 terms.   
In the model in section II, ousting happens after period one.  This formalization of 
the interaction between the regulator and his political master stands in for all possible 
opportunities for ousting.   In actual regulatory practice, commissioners can be ousted 
(formally or informally) in the middle of a term or between terms.  The data show that 22% 
of commissioners leave office before the expiration of their term, and that 49% of 
commissioners eligible to serve a succeeding term do not.  The reason for this career exit 
by regulators is the focus of our analysis. 
The electricity industry in the U.S. has been subject to regulation by state public 
utility commissions, and we take the retail electricity price as a key variable of interest.  
During the period of our study, states imposed different forms of price regulation, from 
                                                 
20
 These states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia. 
21
 These states are Florida, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Texas.  The trend away from election in recent 
decades continues the longer trend triggered by the receding tide of early 20
th
 century populism.  
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traditional rate of return regulation, in which every attempted retail price change 
necessitates a rate hearing at the PUC, to alternative forms of regulation such as price 
caps and rate freezes.  In the later years of our study, some states also deregulated (and 
re-regulated, in some cases) parts of the electricity industry, although retail prices are 
typically still regulated.  Changes in utility costs, whether due to fluctuating fuel input 
prices for electricity generation or restructuring of wholesale electricity markets, have led 
to many opportunities over the years for PUCs to set new retail prices.   When approving 
changes, in most cases—77% of the time for residential prices in our data—PUCs raise 
electricity prices.  Despite the fact that PUCs in all states were designed to function as 
independent regulatory agencies (Schuler, 1996),
22
 public outcry frequently greets even 
necessary rate increases, not only from residents but also from politicians such as 
governors eager to support their constituents.   
Given these facts, we hypothesize that higher electricity prices lead to a higher 
probability that a commissioner is ousted.  In terms of the model, we thus associate 
congruence with lower prices. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Higher prices lead to more regulatory exit.   
 
To test our hypothesis we use data on retail electricity prices charged to 
residential and industrial customers.  These data, calculated separately for residential and 
industrial customers as the average revenue from electricity service (in $/KWH), are 
available annually at the state level from the Department of Energy for the sample 
                                                 
22
 The PUCs‘ decisions are ―not subject to revision by higher administrative authority, and nearly all claim 
quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative power‖ (Schuler, 1996).    
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period.
23
  To control for input costs, we use the weighted average fossil-fuel input cost 
specific to inputs used in each state and year.
24
 
If politics and pressure groups are the cause of ousting, then the more effective 
the interest group, the greater the impact on ousting should be.  Compared to residential 
consumers, large industrial users of electricity have more at stake and are fewer in 
number.  They are also likely to be more efficient at pressuring regulators, because they 
can form a more organized, focused interest group.  All these characteristics make 
industry a more effective interest group to counter the power of the regulated utilities 
(Becker, 1983).  Indeed, Anderson (1981) found that large electricity users play an 
important role in determining energy policy.  Thus, we refine Hypothesis 1 with the 
expectation that industrial price changes have more effect on ousting than residential 
prices.  
One limitation of the commissioner data is clear.  When a commissioner leaves 
the PUC in the middle of a term, the data indicate neither the reason for leaving nor 
whether exit was voluntary.  Similarly, we do not see in the data whether a commissioner 
ran for re-election (or wished to be re-appointed) if he
25
 did not serve a second (or 
subsequent) term.  Even if we observed whether a commissioner ran for re-election, we 
would not limit our definition of ousting to losing an election because the choice to run is 
                                                 
23
 The data are from series ESRCD from the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA) State Energy 
Data System (SEDS) datafile ―Prices, 1970-2006,‖ available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/_seds.html.  Raw data are in dollars per Btu; we converted to $/KWH 
assuming the EIA conversion factor of 3,412 Btu/KWH. 
24
 The data for 1970-1990 are from EIA database EIA-906, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia906u.html.  The fossil-fuel input cost index is created for 
each state and year by multiplying the fraction of generation by electricity utilities from input i by its price, 
where i = coal, oil, and natural gas.  For years after 1990, the data source is the same database, available for 
these years from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sprdshts.html, and the same method is 
used to create the cost index, except that all generators are included, not just utilities, since independent 
power producers become much more important in latter years of the sample and because a few states had 
no generation from utilities at all by 2005. 
25
 Since four-fifths of regulators are male in our data, we use the male pronoun throughout. 
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endogenous.  A choice not to run for a second term might still effectively be an ousting, 
since it may have been clear to the commissioner that there was little chance of re-
election.
26
  A major question of the paper, however, is whether regulators exit because 
they are ousted—forced out for political reasons—or for unrelated reasons.  Some 
commissioners may move on to other employment for reasons other than political 
pressure, retire before serving the maximum allowed number of terms, or even die in 
office.  Such reasons apart from the political economy of regulation will show up in the 
regressions as additional noise.  In econometric terms, exit for such reasons apart from 
the political economy variables is incorporated in the error term in the regression 
equation (or by the inherent randomness of the duration process in the Weibull 
regressions).  If a large proportion of exit is due to unrelated factors apart from ousting or 
capture, then the large error term will cause imprecision in the coefficient estimates.  In 
part for this reason, we focus more on the signs of the coefficients than on the magnitudes.  
In the absence of directly observing the cause of exit, we instead rely on 
suggestions from economic theory to inform us which causes predominate.  The theory 
suggests that the cost of the principal to remove an agent is a key factor.   
 
Hypothesis 2:  Where the principal’s cost of ousting the regulator is lower, there will be 
more regulatory exit. 
 
Rejecting Hypothesis 2 would indicate that regulatory exit has little to do with ousting 
and instead is driven mainly by retirements or other apolitical career concerns. 
                                                 
26
 Similarly, a commissioner may leave during a term due to political pressure or seeing ―the hand writing 
on the wall‖ without formally being removed from office, and we would consider that to be an ousting by 
our definition as well.  
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Observed variables that pertain to θ, the cost of ousting, include the method of 
commissioner selection, how much the leeway the state governor has to remove 
commissioners from office, and a measure of how liberal is the citizens‘ ideology.  We 
assume that regulators appointed by governors are easier to oust, because recall elections 
for regulatory officials are expensive and require organization of a disperse interest group, 
compared to the relative ease with which a governor can act.  For the latter, we create a 
binary variable strong governor, which takes a value of one if the governor can remove 
commissioners without a trial or the concurrence of the state legislature.
27
  About half the 
states have a strong governor by this definition.  Strong governors have a lower cost of 
ousting than do other governors or voters.  We also a collected a measure of citizen 
ideology, CI (originally on a 100 point scale; 0 = extremely conservative, 100 = 
extremely liberal, although we apply a logit transform to the variable in the regressions) 
by state and year from Berry et al. (1998; data updated through 2005 on the authors‘ 
website). Relying on literature from empirical political science showing that activism is 
associated with liberal political ideology,
28
 we assume that the cost of ousting is lower 
where the electorate is more liberal.
29
   We expect that commissioners are more 
susceptible to ousting when their views differ more from those of the citizens.   
The theory also suggests that where π is lower and congruence is less likely, 
ousting is less likely:   
 
                                                 
27
 We created the strong governor variable from information in the NARUC Yearbooks cited above and 
from additional checking of state statutes and constitutions. Removal is usually ―for cause‖ except in a few 
states where removal can be ―at will‖. 
28
 Levenson and Miller (1976) state that ―[P]ast research has indicated that activism is positively related to 
a liberal political ideology….‖   
29
 Cost, in this case, encompasses both psychic and organizational costs. 
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Hypothesis 3:  Where commissioners are less likely to hold preferences that are 
congruent with those of the governor and the electorate, there will be more 
regulatory exit. 
 
We expect that commissioners are less likely to be congruent, and therefore more 
likely to be ousted, when their party affiliation differs from that of the governor and when 
the governor at time of reappointment did not originally appoint the commissioner.
30
  We 
can test the effect of congruence of the commissioner‘s and the median voter‘s ideology 
in the state only indirectly.  The measure of liberal citizen ideology (CI) described above 
can reflect small differences in political attitudes, but for commissioners only the political 
party affiliation is available.  If all commissioners were at the extremes of the ideological 
spectrum, then we would assume that increases in CI would lead to more congruence 
with and less ousting of Democrat commissioners, and less congruence with and more 
ousting of Republican commissioners.  To the extent that commissioners are not 
ideological extremists, this conclusion is blurred, because (for example) increases in an 
already liberal state‘s CI may move citizens further from a commissioner who is a 
moderate Democrat.  Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 indicates that even for Democratic 
commissioners, a more liberal citizenry may lead to more ousting.  Thus, a weaker 
prediction is that any positive impact of ideology on ousting will show up stronger for 
Republican commissioners than for Democrats. 
An important question is whether regulators exit because they are ousted or 
because of capture and the revolving door.  While there is no explicit revolving door in 
the model, if the enticement of capture is the source of the dissonance rent we can 
                                                 
30
 Data on governors and their party affiliations are from answers.com. 
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associate capture with parameter r.  We cannot measure dissonance rent or the regulated 
industry‘s contribution to it directly.  However, we proxy systematic changes in r across 
time and states with an indicator for state having a restriction on how quickly former 
commissioners can take jobs with firms in the regulated industry (revolving door 
restrictions).
31
  About three-fifths of the states have such restrictions.  Ceteris paribus, 
states with such revolving door restrictions have a lower present value of the gains from 
dissonance than other states.
32
 If capture is the source of dissonance rent and the 
motivation for regulator exit, then revolving door restrictions will be negatively 
correlated with exit.  If exit is due to ousting unrelated to capture, then revolving door 
restrictions will not be negatively associated with exit.  Thus, the sign and significance of 
this variable can suggest whether politically motivated ousting or capture predominate in 
the data.  
 
Hypothesis 4 (null – D40):  Commissioners leave involuntarily because they are ousted 
for political reasons after raising prices. 
Hypothesis 4 (alternative – D4A):  Commissioners leave because they are captured and 
take advantage of the revolving door.  
 
We include other variables in the regressions that are not directly motivated by 
the theoretical model.  While there is no exogenous parameter reflecting the degree of 
                                                 
31
 Information on the laws governing the removal of commissioners from office and the time restrictions on 
the revolving door to industry is taken from NARUC Yearbooks, and supplemented with data helpfully 
shared with us by Marc Law.  Where data were in conflict between the sources, we generally gave 
precedence to the NARUC Yearbooks.  See Law and Long (2011) for a description of the alternate data 
source. 
32
 We do not associate the revolving door restrictions with  because the discount factor pertains to more 
than just the revolving door offer in the model. 
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accountability in Besley‘s (2006) model, it is reasonable to expect that when a 
commissioner can be held more accountable for the actions of the entire commission that 
there will be more ousting.  We have two proxy variables for how accountable the 
regulator is for outcomes.  One is whether the commissioner is in the majority party of 
the PUC, under the assumption that members of the minority party are outvoted more 
often.  Another is the size of the PUC.  If the commission has more members, then any 
individual member is less responsible for outcomes, because the probability that the 
individual is the median voter is lower.  Larger PUCs therefore correspond to less 
individual accountability and less ousting. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Where commissioners can be more readily identified as responsible for 
commission actions, there will be more regulatory exit. 
 
The regressors of interest are summarized in Table 1, where the expected impacts 
are with reference to the hypotheses above.  We supplement the dataset with US Census 
estimates of state population to control for heterogeneity in market size, per capita 
income, and the status of electricity deregulation in the state.
33
  These variables are 
included as control variables only, and absorb some of the main relevant differences 
among states.  Summary statistics for all the data are in Table 2. 
The final implication of the political economy model is that ousting leads to 
prices that are lower than the counterfactual world of no political discipline.  First, 
ousting a dissonant regulator leads to a chance that the replacement will be congruent the 
                                                 
33
 Deregulation status data is from the EIA, following links available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html.  
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next period.  Second, in the ―oust the louse‖ equilibrium, the threat of ousting deters 
dissonant regulators from raising prices, as long as their dissonance rent is not too large.  
The model thus implies that ousting leads to lower future prices, because of regulatory 
turnover and the demonstration that ousting is a credible threat. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Past ousting leads to lower regulated prices. 
 
IV. Empirical Model for the Determinants of Ousting 
We are interested in modeling the determinants of a commissioner‘s tenure at a 
PUC, which comprises two parts:  the present term and possible re-appointment or re-
election to a subsequent term.  We associate leaving mid-term or failing to obtain a 
subsequent term with leaving office after period 1 in the theoretical model.  Since the 
commissioner need not serve the entire term, and indeed often does not, we model the 
first part of tenure as a duration.  To the duration model we append a binary dependent 
variable model for the second part, the re-appointment/election outcome.  The bipartite 
structure of our empirical model thus does not constrain regressors such as electricity 
prices to have the same effect on whether a commissioner leaves mid-term and whether 
he serves another term. 
Let i index commissioners and j index terms served by a commissioner.  Let tij be 
the duration of commissioner i‘s stay in office for term j and Tij be the term length if 
served in full. Thus 0 < tij  Tij.  Let yij be a binary variable taking a value of one if the 
commissioner was re-appointed or re-elected (zero otherwise), and dij be an indicator 
taking a value of one if the commissioner served his entire term and was eligible (by 
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statute)
34
 in that term for re-election or re-appointment (zero otherwise).  Let f(t) be the 
density function for the duration process, the hazard rate (the rate at which tenure ends 
given that it did not end before time t) of which may depend on the contemporaneous 
level of time-varying covariates (regressors) xij(t).  We take f to be the Weibull 
distribution, and so the hazard rate at t is 
 h(t;xij(t)) = pexp(xij(t)′)t
 p-1
 (1) 
 
where  is an unknown coefficient vector to be estimated and p is a shape parameter 
determining the duration dependence of the distribution.
35
  Let rij be the probability that 
yij = 1, which also depends on regressors.  We model rij with probit regression.
36
  The 
likelihood of an observation (tij,yij) is then 
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The covariates are not made explicit in the notation to avoid clutter.  The first part (in the 
curly braces) takes the form of a standard right-censored duration model.  In this 
application, the mass at the censoring point Tij (which looks like the contribution of a 
right-censored spell to the likelihood) is the probability that term ij is served to 
completion.  The second part of equation (2) in the square brackets is the likelihood for a 
binary dependent variable estimation, but only for the observations where the 
                                                 
34
 Only three states have term limits that affected commissioners serving during our study period.  In 
Arizona, commissioners could serve no more than one consecutive term during 1992-2000 and no more 
than two consecutive terms thereafter.  In Montana, commissioners could serve no more than 8 years in any 
16 year period after 1995.  In New Mexico, commissioners could serve no more than two consecutive terms 
after 1996.  Term limits potentially affected only 10 opportunities for reappointment or reelection in the 
data. 
35
 Equation (1) is the ―proportional hazards‖ specification of the Weibull model.  When p > 1, the hazard 
function increases with time (positive duration dependence); p < 1 leads to a declining hazard and negative 
duration dependence. 
36
 Thus with regressors zit and coefficients , p(zit′) = (zit′), where  is the cumulative normal density 
function. 
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commissioner actually could have served another term.  If the stochastic processes 
generating tit and yit are independent, which we maintain for simplicity, each part of the 
likelihood can be consistently estimated by itself.   Joint estimation can improve 
efficiency if common covariates enter both parts of the likelihood.
37
 
For actual estimation, the likelihood for the duration part of the model has to be 
adjusted to account for time-varying covariates and for the fact that tit is often not 
observed directly but is instead interval censored.
38
  The censoring occurs because for 
some commissioners we know they left office between two dates but do not know exactly 
when.  These complications in estimation, which do not affect the interpretation of the 
hazard rate coefficients in (1), are explained in the appendix. 
We do not include state fixed effects in the regressions because revolving door 
restrictions never changes during the sample period in about half the states, other key 
variables (such as appointed, large PUC, and) vary over time in only a handful of states, 
and strong governor varies only in the cross section.  All estimation, however, include 
two-way fixed effects for the 11 North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) 
regions and years.
39
 Thus, in our ―laboratory of the states,‖ identification of the impacts 
of the political economy variables comes from deviation from national trends across time 
within a state and from variation among states within the same region.  Using regional 
instead of state-level fixed effects is a compromise between pure cross-sectional and 
within-unit identification.  Other political economy studies of regulation have also used 
                                                 
37
 Given that joint estimation changes only the standard errors, not the coefficient estimates (because while 
regressors may appear in both the duration and probit models, no parameters are common to both), and that 
the improvement in the p-values of the estimates was small, we do not report the results from the joint 
estimation. 
38
 Our work appears to be the first application in the economics literature of hazard rate modeling for 
interval-censored data with time-varying covariates. 
39
 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str_fuel/html/fig02.html for a map of the regions. 
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regional instead of state fixed effects (e.g., Quast, 2008).  We comment on the results of 
adding state fixed effects in the results below.  
In the absence of state fixed effects, it is possible that some of the political 
economy variables are endogenous.  For some variables, endogeneity would appear to be 
unlikely.  For example, state law usually determined strong governor long before the 
sample period and sometimes applies broadly to removing any state appointee, not just 
utility commissioners, and so is unlikely to be endogenous in an ousting regression.  For 
other variables, such as revolving door restrictions, endogeneity may be more 
problematic (but even there, the law usually pertains to state employees generally).  In 
such cases, it is best to interpret the results as illuminating correlations in the data to test 
whether they are in accord with theory, in the spirit of reduced-form estimation, rather 
than as precisely measuring the causal impact of a structural parameter.  
V. Empirical Results 
As described above, we separately estimate whether a commissioner serves his 
full term and whether he is re-appointed or re-elected.  The reader may refer to Table 1 
for a summary of how the regressors relate to the hypotheses.  In the final part of the 
section, we look at whether past ousting affects future electricity prices. 
a. Mid-term Ousting – Main Results 
The results of the hazard rate regressions for being ousted mid-term are in Table 3.  
We investigate prices rather than margins because complete cost data are not available.  
However, we control for cost in part by including the index of fuel input prices.  In the 
first few estimations, we do not control for any variables related to the party affiliation of 
the commissioner, to allow use of the full sample.  In Estimation D1 (with D for duration 
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model) we use residential electricity prices (in logs), and apart from prices do not include 
any of the other political economy variables related to the theoretical model.  The 
reported coefficients are exponentiated, to show the proportional effect on the baseline 
hazard rate from a unit increase in the variable.  Thus figures greater than one imply a 
higher likelihood of ousting.   
Higher retail electricity prices significantly increase the hazard rate of the 
commissioner.  Its multiplier of exp( = 2.138 means that an increase of one unit in the 
log price slightly more than doubles the hazard rate.  Stated in elasticity terms, an 
increase of one percent in the residential price increases the hazard rate by  = 0.76 
percent.  Thus, higher prices appear to lead to ousting and we accept Hypothesis 1.  This 
conclusion is the same whether prices are in nominal or real terms.
40
  We also verified 
that replacing the current prices and cost index with one-year lagged variables leads to 
the same results.  Most of the control variables besides cost are individually insignificant.  
We leave them in the estimation because they are jointly significant (p = 0.012) and 
because they help capture differences among states.  The Weibull shape parameter is 
significant, and is estimated to be about 0.5 in logs, which implies p = 1.6.
41
   
In estimation D2, we add the industrial electricity price in the specification, for 
the reasons discussed above regarding Hypothesis 1.  The hazard rate increases with 
industrial prices, and by more than from residential prices.  In accord with Becker‘s 
(1987) notions of effective interest groups, the impact (a multiplier of 2.26) is significant 
                                                 
40
 Since price is in logs and year fixed effects are included, the coefficient on nominal and real log prices 
are identical. 
41
 The significance of p implies that it is not appropriate to use an exponential duration model, because 
there is evidence of duration dependence.  Since p > 1, the hazard of being ousted increases with time.  This 
may be due to a simple ―record‖ effect:  with more time in office, a commissioner has a larger accumulated 
record of decisions to which the principal may object. 
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and much larger than the residential price effect in the same estimation, which is 
insignificant.   
In estimation D3, reported in Table 4, we add the other political economy 
variables pertaining to the theoretical model, except those involving the party affiliation 
of the commissioner.  In the model, the parameters π, θ, and so forth determine the 
regulator‘s choice of prices, and therefore including prices in the empirical model along 
with the variables proxying for the primitives of the model is redundant.  We therefore 
drop the price variables in the following estimations.
42
  Our focus in estimation D3 is on 
the direction of the effects of the political economy variables, to allow us to both test 
implications of the model (Hypotheses 2, 3, and 5) and help differentiate between the two 
explanations for regulatory exit (Hypothesis 4). 
Ousting is 61% more common in states with appointed commissioners, in accord 
with Hypothesis 2.  When the governor has authority to remove commissioners 
unilaterally (strong governor), the hazard rate is 46% higher, lending further support to 
Hypothesis 2 and the model.  Without the party variables in the specification, we do not 
test Hypothesis 3 yet.
43
 
The effect of the revolving door restrictions is to increase the hazard rate by 39%, 
in accord with null Hypothesis 4.  If industry uses the revolving door to reward 
commissioners who raise prices, then we would expect that the hazard rate would be 
                                                 
42
 The issue is similar to reduced form estimation of a supply and demand system.  After solving for price 
and quantity in terms of the primitives of the model, only the primitives are included as regressors in 
reduced form estimation.  However, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the variables of 
interest in estimations D3-D5 change little even if we do include the price variables. 
43
 We could add the variable for the current governor being the same as at the beginning of the term to test 
Hypothesis 3, even though we expect this variable to have more effect at the time of reappointment or re-
election.  If we add this variable to estimation D3, its coefficient is in the direction in accord with D3 but is 
insignificant, probably because there is not a lot of variation in the variable (since during much of a 
commissioner‘s term the original governor is still in office).  The likelihood barely improves with the 
addition of the variable, and the other coefficients change little. 
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larger in states that have no restrictions on how soon former commissioners can join 
firms in a regulated industry, the opposite of our finding.  While not a definitive test of 
capture theory versus ousting, the result does suggest that the latter is more prevalent in 
the data. Regarding commissioner accountability, we find that when the commissioner 
serves on a PUC with five or more members, the hazard rate is 24% lower.  The finding 
is in accord with Hypothesis 5. 
We add the party affiliation variables in estimation D4, which requires dropping 
the observations for which the commissioner‘s party is unknown.  The political economy 
coefficients that were also in estimation D3 have little change in their magnitudes and 
retain their significance, although the estimates for large commissions and revolving door 
restrictions lose a significance star due to the smaller sample size.   For the new variables 
to test Hypothesis 2, the more liberal the citizen‘s ideology, the more ousting, for both 
Democrats and Republican commissioners.  Furthermore, the coefficient is larger for 
Republicans, in accord with Hypothesis 3.
44
  The other new variable testing Hypothesis 3 
is for the commissioner having the party affiliation of the governor.  When the governor 
and the commissioner are not in the same party, the commissioners are less likely to serve 
out their terms, but the effect is too small to be significant (although its direction is in line 
with the hypothesis).  Regarding the new variable pertaining to commissioner 
accountability and Hypothesis 5, we find that when the commissioner is in the majority 
party, the hazard rate is 34% higher, although the coefficient is significant only at the 10% 
level.   
                                                 
44
 The coefficient for Republicans is significantly larger than that for Democrats, with a one-sided p-value 
of 0.09. 
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With the inclusion of two-way fixed effects, identification of the impacts of the 
political economy variables comes from deviation from national trends within a state and 
variation among states within the same region.  Apparently this latter source of variation 
is important in the hazard estimations (unlike our finding below for the re-
appointment/re-election regressions), for if we replace the regional fixed effects in 
estimation D4 with state fixed effects, none of the variables in the model retain 
significance.  Therefore, while the ―laboratory of the states‖ reveals interesting and 
suggestive correlation between the political economy variables and ousting, the 
laboratory within the states apparently does not have enough variation in ousting and the 
regressors with which to work.  The results including state fixed effects are strong for the 
probit estimations, as we show below. 
b. Mid-term Ousting – Robustness Tests 
The results in the previous section give support to each of the hypotheses 
following from the political economy model of ousting.  Before turning to the model for 
re-appointment or re-election, we examine the determinants of not completing a term 
further to check the robustness of our conclusions.  First, one may suspect that 
commissioner salary may be an important determinant of whether commissioners serve 
their full terms instead of seeking employment elsewhere.  It is also worth investigating 
whether salary is correlated with the political economy variables in the specification, for 
if so the estimates may be biased. For example, perhaps in states with revolving door 
restrictions, it is more difficult to attract high-quality talent to public service, so that 
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commissioners have fewer qualifications or less experience, and are ousted more for 
making poor decisions.
45
   
Our investigation found no comprehensive publicly available data on the salaries 
of individual commissioners.  However, the Book of the States serial published by the 
Council of State Governments, a source used by other researchers, reports the salary of 
the ―chief administrative official‖ in charge of public utility regulation.  This would 
appear to be the chair of the commission. However, in some states the chair earns a 
higher salary than other commissioners, and the Book of the States reports salary ranges 
for only a few states.  Some of the salary data are not updated each year, and we 
interpolated in such cases. 
Examination of the correlation between salary and the political economy variables 
does not indicate cause for concern.  Log salary has positive correlation greater than 0.1 
with the following variables only:  appointed (corr. = 0.21), revolving door restrictions 
(0.47), CI×Democrat (0.23), and large PUC (0.14).  The other political economy 
variables show little correlation with log salary.  If higher salaries lead to less exit, then 
omitting salary from the estimation may bias the coefficients of these positively 
correlated variables downward.
46
  With the exception of the final variable, however, this 
bias would be against the confirmation of the hypotheses above.  It is also notable that 
salaries tend to be higher where there are revolving door restrictions, perhaps as a 
compensating differential to attract higher quality talent to public service. 
Even though the discussion above indicates that omitting salaries are not likely to 
cause incorrect acceptance of the hypotheses, except perhaps for the large PUC variable, 
                                                 
45
 Several of the robustness tests in this section were suggested by anonymous referees. 
46
 Of course, this statement is only heuristic, as correlation among the entire set of regressors in a multiple 
regression makes the direction of omitted variable bias indeterminate in general. 
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we add log salary to estimation D5 (also in Table 4).  There are no changes in the 
direction of the impacts of the political economy variables, although some of the 
significance levels change.  Commissioner in majority party becomes significant at the 5% 
level.  The salary impact itself is insignificant, and none of the conclusions above change.  
Perhaps the largest change is for the coefficient for revolving door restrictions, which as 
expected increases in size and gains significance at the 5% level.
47
 
The unobserved quality of the regulator may also be an important omitted factor.  
Presumably, some regulators prove to be inept or corrupt and rightfully lose their office.  
Thus, perhaps a strong governor exercises the option to oust a commissioner because of 
demonstrated incompetence rather than dissonant preferences.  We refine our 
specification in two ways to lend credence to the political economy model as the 
explanation for ousting. First, we repeat estimation D4 but interact the strong governor 
variable with an indicator for the commissioner serving a second or higher term, under 
the assumption that it is likely that incompetence or corruption would have become 
known during their first term. The results (not reported) show that the coefficient for a 
strong governor during a commissioner‘s initial term (eβ = 1.26, p = 0.19) is even lower 
than during subsequent terms (e
β
 = 1.41, p = 0.02).  Thus, the apparent impact of the 
strong governor variable does not appear to be only an artifact of quality differences 
among regulators. 
In a second test to check whether strong governors oust mainly for reasons of 
dissonant preferences, we repeat estimation D4 with an interaction between strong 
governor and same governor, an indicator for whether the current governor is the same as 
                                                 
47
 Since the salary variable is usually really the chair‘s salary, we repeated estimation D5 interacting salary 
with an indicator variable for whether the commissioner was serving as chair.  While the impact of salary 
was stronger for chairs (p-value = 0.10), no other results changed.  
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when the term began.  Presumably, the degree of preference alignment is greater when 
the commissioner was appointed by (or at least began office under) the current governor.  
The results (not reported) show that the coefficient for strong governor × same governor 
(e
β
 = 1.39, p = 0.07) is lower than the coefficient for strong governor × different governor 
(e
β
 = 1.59, p = 0.01), as congruence of preferences in the model suggests.   
Finally, we argued above that it is appropriate to leave the electricity price out of 
the estimations with the political economy variables, since these are reduced form 
regressions and model predicts that prices are determined by the other variables.  
Nonetheless, we examined the results of adding the residential electricity price from 
estimation D1 to the specification from estimation D4.  As expected, once controlling for 
the political economy variables, the price coefficient is insignificant (although the 
coefficient is still positive).  Changes in the other coefficients were negligible, there were 
no changes in significance levels, and an LR test rejects the need for including the price 
variable. 
We also perform a falsification test directed at Hypothesis 4.  Since we do not 
include state fixed effects in the model, it may be the case that revolving door restrictions 
proxies a political climate in the state where commissioners are over scrutinized and 
undervalued, leading to more turnover.  We explored how the political economy variables 
would affect another high-level state board member:  the university regent.  Since public 
university regents ―regulate‖ a not-for-profit, state-run enterprise, there is nothing 
equivalent to the revolving door between the PUC and private industry.  Thus, the 
indicator for PUC revolving door restrictions, even if they apply generally to all state 
employees, should not be significant when applied to university regents‘ tenures.  Given 
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that regents are still politically appointed or elected, the other political economy variables 
related to the cost of ousting or the degree of accountability should still be in line with 
our other hypotheses, however. 
Finding data on university regents proved to be much more difficult than for PUC 
commissioners.  However, we were able to find complete enough data on regents‘ term 
dates from a variety of sources to assemble a dataset covering 832 terms of 609 regents 
from ten states.
48
  The results of a specification similar to estimation D3 are in Table 5.
49
  
Whether region fixed effects are included (estimation D6) or not (estimation D7), 
revolving door restrictions has no significant effect.  To make sure the result is not driven 
by a single state in our small sample, we repeated estimation D6 ten times leaving out 
each state in turn; in no iteration was revolving door restrictions significant at even the 
20% level.
50
  For the other political economy variables, appointed and strong governor 
still increase the hazard, in accord with Hypothesis 2, and larger regent boards are still 
associated with longer tenure, in accord with Hypothesis 5.
51
 
We also replicated estimation D1 for an additional falsification test (results not 
shown), for electricity prices should have nothing to do with the tenure of university 
regents unless prices in reality only proxy for omitted factors affecting the political 
economy of a state.  The residential electricity price coefficients were insignificant as 
expected, whether region fixed effects were included (e
β
 = 0.65, p = 0.64) or not (e
β
 = 
0.95, p = 0.94). 
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 See note to Table 5 for the list of covered states. 
49
 We used D3 instead of D4 because party data were not available for regents.  
50
 The insignificance of the coefficient is also not due merely to the smaller sample size.  Even if there were 
as many observations as in estimation D3, a simple adjustment of the standard error in line with root-N 
asymptotics suggests that the coefficient would still lack significance. 
51
 We again use the median board size as the threshold for a ―large‖ board.  Whereas for PUCs this was 
four members, for regent boards it is eight. 
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c. Ousting at the End of a Term  
We turn now to the second part of the model for ousting, that for re-appointment 
or re-election.  The results from the probit model for commissioners who served out their 
terms and did not face binding term limits are reported in Table 6.  Apart from the price 
variable, we include similar variables as in the hazard estimations except we do not 
include strong governor, since mid-term removal from office is not at issue here.  We 
also include another political variable, same governor, which here is an indicator for 
whether the governor at time of re-appointment or re-election is the same as when the 
preceding term began. 
Table 6 reports the marginal effects from the probit estimations, which are the 
increase in the probability (expressed in percentage points) of re-appointment or re-
election.
52
   Initial exploration of the data found that log residential electricity prices best 
entered the specification by allowing the bottom 5% of outliers their own slope 
coefficient, and so in Estimation R1 prices enter as a spline with the knot at the fifth 
percentile of the price distribution.
53
   For all but the bottom 5% of prices, for which there 
is no significant effect, higher residential electricity prices are significantly associated 
with a lower probability of serving another term.  Every percentage increase in the 
electricity price in that range reduces the likelihood of serving another term by 21 
percentage points, in accord with Hypothesis 1.  As in the hazard estimations, several of 
the control variables are insignificant, but we again leave them in the estimation to absorb 
                                                 
52
 Replacing probit with logit estimation does not change any of our conclusions in Table 6. 
53
 We investigated the nonlinearity in the marginal effect of residential prices on serving another term with 
a generalized additive model (GAM, see Hastie and Tibshirani (1990)), allowing prices to enter the 
specification nonparametrically.  The plot of the fitted relationship revealed that there is no effect of prices 
below the 0.05 quantile of prices and a nearly strictly linear negative relationship above that quantile.   
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some of the heterogeneity among states remaining after the inclusion of the regional fixed 
effects.   
In Estimation R2, we drop the price variable and add the political economy 
variables except for those related to the commissioner‘s party.54  Being appointed instead 
of elected is associated with a 14.2 percentage point drop in the probability of serving 
another term, in accord with Hypothesis 2.  The large size of this effect may also be due 
to the well-known incumbency advantage enjoyed by elected officials (Ansolabehere and 
Snyder, 2002).  Based on the incumbency effect for regulators of about six percentage 
points estimated by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002),
55
 it appears unlikely that all of the 
effect we observe is merely due to the advantage of incumbency when the position is 
elected.  
When the same governor is in office as at the start of the previous term, there is a 
17.2 percentage point increase in the probability of serving the new term again, in accord 
with Hypothesis 3.  Revolving door restrictions has no significant impact, and so we do 
not reject null Hypothesis 4.  When the commissioners serve on a larger board, they are 
more likely to serve again, as implied by Hypothesis 5.  The latter effect is insignificant 
in estimation R2, but gains significance at the 10% level in estimations R3 and R4 once 
the party regressors are included. 
                                                 
54
 If we leave the price variable in estimation R2, it is significant at the 10% level. 
55
 Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) are the only researchers we found who consider the incumbency 
advantage for state regulatory officials, although they group them with other ―lower‖ state officers.  Gordon 
and Landa (2009) review several factors that may lead to an incumbency advantage, including the 
campaign discount (it is ―less costly for an incumbent to run for reelection than for a challenger to mount a 
campaign‖), pro-incumbent endorser bias (created ―from the unique opportunities officeholders have to 
cultivate relationships with influential interest groups or elites‖), and district partisan bias toward the 
incumbent‘s party.  The latter is not likely to be important for PUC elections, since commissioners typically 
represent the entire state. 
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In estimation R3, we add the party-related variables, causing a small reduction in 
the sample size.  For the new variables, the citizen ideology coefficients are negative for 
commissioners of both parties, in accord with Hypothesis 2, although the effect is 
significant only for Democrats.  While the coefficient on liberal ideology is larger for 
Democrats, the estimates are not precise enough to reject the hypothesis that the true 
coefficient is larger for Republicans (one-sided p-value = 0.16), and so Hypothesis 3 is 
not supported, it is not rejected.  In line with Hypothesis 3, on the other hand, same 
governor has a positive impact.  While the effect for being in the majority party is 
insignificant, being in the same party as the governor is significantly associated with a 7.3 
percentage point increase in the probability of serving a succeeding term.  The latter is 
also in accord with Hypothesis 3.   
In summary, the results from the empirical investigation of regulators leaving 
office—both mid-term and at time of re-appointment or re-election—generally support 
that the cause of exit is ousting in accord with the political economy model.  The results 
also suggest that the revolving door plays a minor role compared to ousting.  While not 
every regressor in every specification has a statistically significant impact in the direction 
suggested by theory, many do, and none of them has a significant impact that points in 
the other direction. 
d. Ousting at the End of a Term – Robustness Tests 
As with the hazard estimations, we examine the determinants of serving a 
succeeding term further to check the robustness of the results of our hypothesis tests.  We 
add log salary to estimation R4 (also in Table 6).  There are no changes in the direction, 
magnitude, or significance of the political economy estimates.  The salary impact is 
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significant, in the expected direction:  a one percent increase in salary leads to an 18.4 
percentage point increase in the probability of serving again.  In another check, we add 
electricity prices back into the specification from estimation R3 (results not reported).  
The second spline component of price, while smaller, retains significance (marginal 
effect = -18.7, p-value = 0.04).  There are no changes in the direction of the impacts of 
the other political economy variables, although the coefficients for CI × Democrat and 
large PUC lose a significance star. 
Even though several of the political economy variables have little variation over 
time, in estimation R5 we replace the regional fixed effects with state fixed effects.  
Without relying on cross-sectional variation within regions to identify the impacts of the 
political economy variables, the significance level of many of them falls.  However, none 
of the coefficients changes sign, and the coefficients for large PUC and revolving door 
restrictions gain significance.  The latter is in the direction predicted by null Hypothesis 4. 
e. The Impact of Ousting on Regulatory Behavior 
We close our empirical work with a final question:  does ousting effectively deter 
future dissonant regulatory behavior?  If ousting does not curb the approval of higher 
electricity prices, then there would be little point in punishing regulators by ousting them, 
apart from gratifying a principal‘s desire for retribution.  In the estimations in Table 7, we 
regress prices on past ousting to test Hypothesis 6.  In these panel regressions, the unit of 
observation is a state and the dependent variable is the log of real electricity prices.
56
  
Since regulators are likely to consider recent experience in the state regarding ousting as 
more germane to their pricing decisions than ousting from long ago, we construct a 
                                                 
56
 We convert all monetary variables to real terms because we do not include year fixed effects in 
estimations P1-P3.   
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measure, past ousting, that weights recent years most heavily.  In particular, treating the 
amount of mid-term and end-of-term ousting in the state and year as a flow, past ousting 
is the stock of ousting from the beginning of the sample through the previous year, with a 
ten percent depreciation rate.
57
  
The specification of the model requires care, for the preceding results demonstrate 
that higher prices are positively correlated with ousting.  Thus, one of the expected 
effects of a larger amount of past ousting is a higher price level.  To control for ousting‘s 
impact before the current period on the price level, we add the lagged price to the model.  
Doing so allows the coefficient on past ousting to reflect only the impact on the forward-
looking behavior of the regulators.   
In the first price regression, we include regional fixed effects as before.  We do 
not include year fixed effects for comparability with the following estimations. 
Estimation P1 in Table 7 shows that higher past ousting is associated with lower prices in 
the period, after controlling for the lagged price level, fuel cost, and other control 
variables.  The coefficients from these log-linear regressions are multiplied by 100 in the 
table, to express in percentage points the marginal impact on the dependent variable of a 
one-unit increase in a regressor.  A unit increase in past ousting is associated with a 2.2% 
lower price.
58
  Although the estimate is significant, there are reasons the figure might be 
biased.  Because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable, for consistency the 
model requires that there is no serial correlation in the error terms, which may not be the 
                                                 
57
 We tested the stationarity of past ousting before using it as a regressor.  The null hypothesis of a unit root 
common to all panels was soundly rejected with the tests of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and Harris and 
Tzavalis (1999), where we used the BIC to determine the number of lags for the tests.  
58
 Note that while the coefficient implies that an extra ousting at period t-1 lowers price in period t by 2.2%, 
the dynamics in the model also imply that the impact of a one-period change in ousting is carried forward 
to all future periods.  Since the coefficient on lagged price is positive, the lower price in period t results in a 
price lower than otherwise in period t+1, and so forth. 
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case since the estimation does not include panel fixed effects. Another reason to include 
state fixed effects is that there may be many unobserved determinants of electricity prices 
within a state that vary within the region.  Adding state fixed effects also helps account 
for the unobserved initial stock of ousting in a state.  
In estimations P2 through P4, we include panel fixed effects.  Since standard 
fixed effects models are inconsistent for dynamic panels, we use Blundell and Bond‘s 
(1998) GMM system estimator for dynamic panel data.  In the GMM estimator, lagged 
differences in y instrument for lagged y in a level equation, and lagged y instruments for 
Δy in a second equation that is differenced to remove the fixed effects.59  Given the 
theoretical model and the ousting estimations, we suspect that the error term in the price 
regression may have feedback on future realizations of past ousting.  That is, shocks that 
increase prices in one period may lead to ousting, which will increase future values of 
past ousting.  An advantage of the GMM framework is that we can treat past ousting as 
weakly predetermined instead of strictly exogenous, and assume only that the error term 
is uncorrelated with past realizations of the regressor.  The estimations also account for 
the presence of residual serial correlation of up to two lags in differenced model.
60
   
 The result in estimation P2 is again in accord with Hypothesis 6, for past ousting 
still has a negative and statistically significant impact on prices.  However, the coefficient 
falls to less than half of its magnitude from P1.  The Hansen J statistic fails to reject the 
                                                 
59
 The Blundell and Bond (1998) model performs better than the more familiar Arellano and Bond (1991) 
estimator for dynamic panels when the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is near unity.  We 
performed the estimations with the xtabond2 package in Stata 11. 
60
 Arellano-Bond (1991) and Hansen J tests rejected the hypothesis of no first and second order serial 
correlation in estimations P2-P4, which leads us to exclude an extra two lags from the instrument set for the 
lagged dependent variable.  We also limited the number of lags included as instruments to avoid the 
problems of using too many instruments that be describe below.  In particular, we used Δyt-3 and Δyt-4 to 
instrument yt-1 in the level equation, and yt-4 and yt-5 to instrument Δyt-1 and past oustingt-2 and past oustingt-3 
to instrument for Δpast oustingt in the differences equation.  The other differenced regressors serve as their 
own instruments. 
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validity of the instruments.  In estimation P3, we add political economy variables as 
regressors.  The coefficient on past ousting falls a bit but remains significant.  Most of the 
additional variables are insignificant, except for revolving door restrictions, which has a 
negative impact on prices.  This finding is consistent with the ousting estimations, which 
showed that revolving door restrictions was associated with more ousting, which the 
present estimations show leads to lower prices. 
To avoid using too many instruments, which can lead to bias in the coefficients 
for the endogenous variables and low power of the instrument validity tests (Roodman, 
2009), we do not include year fixed effects in estimations P2 and P3.
61
  The exclusion of 
year fixed effects also allows past ousting to evolve naturally within each state, which 
may be important to the interpretation of its coefficient.
62
  To test whether year fixed 
effects change any conclusions, we add indicator variables for three-year periods in 
estimation P4.
63
  The impact of past ousting rises; now a unit increase in last period‘s 
ousting is associated with a 3.1% lower price the next period.  While the inclusion of the 
extra instruments may bias the estimate, it is nevertheless the case that across the range of 
models we find consistent support for Hypothesis 6.
64
  
                                                 
61
 Each regressor requires another instrument in the GMM, and with a complete set of year indicator 
variables the number of instruments is about the same or greater than the number of panels.  If year fixed 
effects are included in estimations P2 and P3, the Hansen overidentification tests have a p-value of 1.0, 
which is a sign of severe overfitting of the endogenous variables (Roodman, 2009).  Since we cannot 
include a full set of year fixed effects, we verified that including a linear time trend did not remove the 
significance of the coefficient on past ousting in estimations P2 and P3. 
62
 Adding year fixed effects is the same as demeaning each regressor year by year across the states, which 
would destroy the time series properties of past ousting, which are important because it is a stock variable.   
63
 We cannot add fixed effects for pairs or single years without the number of instruments approaching or 
exceeding the number of panels and resulting in signs of overfitting the model (Hansen statistics near 1.0) 
(Roodman, 2009). 
64
 We also explored other depreciation rates—0, 5, and 15%--in the construction of past ousting.  As the 
rate falls, the statistical significance of the coefficient rises, perhaps indicating that regulators have long 
memories when it comes to ousting. 
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VI. Conclusions  
Our empirical results support the five hypotheses stemming from the political 
agency model of ousting.  Retail electricity prices are associated with ousting, both mid-
term and at time of selecting for a second term.  A greater cost of ousting and a greater 
prevalence of congruent regulators are associated with less exit, in accord with the 
theoretical model.  Where accountability is higher, there is more ousting.  Furthermore, 
the finding that revolving door restrictions on post-regulatory employment is associated 
with more ousting suggests that politically motivated ousting is more likely than a 
revolving-door story as the main reason for turnover.  Past ousting also appears to 
discipline regulators‘ decisions, leading to lower future prices, although the magnitude of 
the effect is mild.  
While we have presented evidence that political principals can apparently bring 
pressure to bear on regulators through ousting, we have not addressed the question of the 
optimal degree of control the principal should exert over the regulator.   Insulating the 
regulator from political interference is important to preserve regulatory credibility and 
commitment.  The ability of the regulator to commit to prices and policies is important in 
the presence of long-lived capital investment, to avoid the hold-up problem (Newbery, 
1999).
65
  Cambini and Rondi (2010) find that the higher the degree of independence 
among European regulatory institutions, the higher is the associated investment by the 
regulated firms.
66
  In part for this reason, PUCs in the US were established as 
independent regulatory agencies (Schuler, 1996).  On the other hand, commitment can 
                                                 
65
 When public utility regulators cannot commit to long-term policies, they have incentive to reduce the 
prices that the regulated utilities are allowed to charge after the firm has sunk its investment. Recognizing 
this time inconsistency problem, regulated utilities may invest less than is optimal. 
66
 See Trillas (2010) for a survey of related empirical work on regulatory independence, which generally 
comes to similar conclusions. 
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lead to bad policies being locked in when the regulator may not be benevolent.
67
  
Armstrong and Sappington (2006; sec. 4.5) discuss why complete independence of the 
regulator is not optimal when capture is a possibility, and Martimort (1999) shows that a 
higher potential for capture may call for placing stricter constraints on the regulator.  
In general, the regulator‘s independence, which allows it to act contrary to the 
wishes of the principal, may either increase social welfare (when the principal does not 
want prices to reflect cost) or decrease it (when the principal wants prices to be aligned 
with cost).  In existing empirical studies of regulated industry performance or investment, 
regulatory independence, however measured, typically enters the econometric models in 
linear fashion.  Thus, the corpus of empirical work (see Trillas (2010) for a review) 
generally finds that ―more independence is better‖ with models that do not allow for 
nonlinear impacts of regulatory oversight.  A promising avenue for future research would 
be an empirical examination of whether (and which) regulatory institutions embody the 
optimal amount of independence. 
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Econometric Appendix 
Here we present further details on the duration estimation for mid-term ousting. 
There are two complications not reflected in equation (2) in the main text. First, some of 
the covariates entering hazard rate specification (1) vary between years, and thus vary 
over the tenure of commissioners whose service spans more than one calendar year (time-
varying covariates). Second, some observations are censored. Right censoring occurs in 
the data for two reasons. As mentioned in the text, commissioners serving their full term 
are never ousted and are treated as right-censored observations at time of term end. 
Furthermore, terms still in progress at the end of the observation period for the data are 
also right censored. Less common in duration data models is the interval censoring of 
some of the observations. When a commissioner disappears from the NARUC yearbooks 
before his term ends, the publication does not state the date he left office. Thus, in the 
absence of other information, we only know that the commissioner's tenure ended at 
some point between the record dates of the last yearbook listing the commissioner and the 
first yearbook not listing him. In some cases, we can narrow the range of the interval of 
departure, using data from Beecher (2007), the starting date of the succeeding 
commissioner, or other information we found through extensive searching of PUC 
websites and news media. Thus, we have duration data that may be completely observed, 
right censored, or interval censored. The likelihood for interval-censored Weibull 
duration data with time-varying covariates is presented in Sparling et al. (2006), who 
work out the likelihood for a more general parametric model that nests the Weibull. We 
estimate the model via MLE in Stata 11.1 (using the default options for the ―lf‖ method, 
which include using the Newton-Raphson maximization method with numeric 
derivatives), which converged readily in all specifications.  
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Table 1:  Expected impacts of regressors on ousting 
Variable 
Related to 
parameter 
Related to 
hypothesis 
How 
related 
Expected impact under 
Hypothesis 
Residential price p 1 x   p More exit 
Industrial price p 1 x   p More exit than for residential p 
Commissioner is 
appointed 
 2 x     More exit 
Strong governor  2 x     More exit 
Liberal citizen 
ideology 
 2 x     More exit 
Liberal citizen 
ideology 
π 3 x   π  
More exit for Republicans  
than for Democrats 
Commissioner and 
governor in same 
party 
π  3 x   π  Less exit 
Same governor as at 
start of term 
π 3 x   π  Less exit 
Revolving door 
restrictions 
r 4 (null) x   r  More exit or no effect 
Revolving door 
restrictions 
r 4 (alt.) x   r  Less exit 
Commissioner is on 
a large PUC 
a
* 5 x   a  Less exit 
Commissioner is in 
majority on PUC 
a
* 5 x   a  More exit 
*Parameter a refers to accountability. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Data 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Data for Mid-Term Ousting Analysis     
Retail residential electricity prices 6.901 2.738 1.075 23.347 
Retail industrial electricity prices 4.383 1.981 0.337 17.957 
Commissioner is appointed 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 
Strong governor 0.505 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Revolving door time restrictions 0.607 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Commissioner’s party = majority pty 0.681 0.466 0.000 1.000 
PUC has > 4 commissioners 0.413 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Cmmssr’s party = governor’s pty 0.585 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Citizen ideology score CIit 46.971 15.206 6.860 95.972 
CIit x Democrat commissioner* 25.605 25.412 0.000 95.972 
CIit x Republican commissioner* 18.752 24.940 0.000 91.566 
Commissioner’s party = Democrat 0.568 0.495 0.000 1.000 
Commissioner’s party = Republican 0.389 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Commissioner’s party = Other 0.043 0.203 0.000 1.000 
Deregulation is active 0.068 0.252 0.000 1.000 
Deregulation is suspended 0.007 0.086 0.000 1.000 
State per capita income, log 9.620 0.629 7.954 1.000 
State population, log 15.001 1.044 12.664 10.982 
     
Data for Re-appointment/Re-election 
Analysis 
    
Re-appointed/re-elected 0.494 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Retail residential electricity prices 7.005 2.725 1.145 23.347 
Commissioner is appointed 0.697 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Revolving door time restrictions 0.587 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Cmmssr’s party = majority pty 0.675 0.468 0.000 1.000 
PUC has > 4 commissioners 0.445 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Cmmssr’s party = governor’s pty 0.551 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Citizen ideology score CIit 46.971 15.273 6.860 91.236 
CIit x Democrat commissioner* 26.369 25.113 0.000 91.236 
CIit x Republican commissioner* 17.737 24.850 0.000 86.465 
Same governor as previous term 0.469 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Commissioner’s party = Democrat 0.591 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Commissioner’s party = Republican 0.364 0.481 0.000 1.000 
Commissioner’s party = Other 0.045 0.206 0.000 1.000 
Deregulation is active 0.079 0.270 0.000 1.000 
Deregulation is suspended 0.010 0.101 0.000 1.000 
State per capita income, log 9.652 0.608 7.954 10.982 
State population, log 14.978 1.024 12.695 17.402 
*Variable is divided by 100 and passed through a logit transform to create a regressor. 
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Table 3:  Hazard Rate Estimation for Leaving Mid-Term 
 
Y=time until ousted 
Estimation D1 
exp() 
(s.e.) 
Estimation D2  
exp() 
(s.e.) 
Regressors of interest   
Residential electricity prices, log 2.138** 0.949 
 (0.735) (0.494) 
Industrial electricity prices, log  2.256** 
  (0.832) 
Other control variables   
Fuel input cost index, log 1.057 1.035 
 (0.083) (0.076) 
Deregulation is active 0.544* 0.520** 
 (0.178) (0.170) 
Deregulation is suspended 0.915 0.763 
 (0.585) (0.498) 
Per capita income, log 0.631 0.567 
 (0.246) (0.221) 
State pop, log 1.191*** 1.215*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) 
Weibull shape parameter (log) 0.479*** 0.480*** 
 (0.048) (0.043) 
Likelihood -2100.1 -2098.0 

2
 statistic (d.o.f.) and p-value 24.4 (6) 0.000 31.07 (7) 0.000 
Clusters (commissioners) 1,164 1,164 
 N  1,816 1,816 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes:  Exponentiated coefficients are reported, which can be interpreted as the multiplier on the hazard 
rate.  Robust standard errors for the multipliers are in parentheses (clustered on the individual).  Estimation 
is censored Weibull duration regression (see appendix).  Two-way fixed effects for years and the 11 
Electricity Reliability Council regions are included but not reported.  2 statistic is for the null hypothesis 
that all regressors (excluding fixed effects) have zero coefficients (degrees of freedom are in parentheses). 
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Table 4:  Hazard Rate Estimation for Leaving Mid-Term 
 
Y=time until ousted 
Estimation D3  
exp() 
(s.e.) 
Estimation D4  
exp() 
(s.e.) 
Estimation D5  
exp() 
(s.e.) 
Regressors of interest    
Appointed 1.612** 1.511** 1.547** 
 (0.311) (0.300) (0.312) 
Strong governor 1.463** 1.464** 1.481** 
 (0.223) (0.239) (0.238) 
Citizen ideology x  1.332** 1.249* 
 Democrat commissioner  (0.179) (0.169) 
Citizen ideology x  1.778*** 1.575** 
 Republican commissioner  (0.362) (0.311) 
Commissioner and   0.916 0.897 
 governor in same party  (0.130) (0.126) 
Revolving door restrictions 1.386** 1.330* 1.422** 
 (0.208) (0.216) (0.228) 
Large PUC (> 4  0.763** 0.797* 0.805* 
 commissioners (0.095) (0.103) (0.102) 
Commissioner in majority   1.337* 1.346** 
 party  (0.200) (0.203) 
Commissioner salary, log   0.799 
   (0.311) 
Other control variables    
Fuel input cost index, log 1.104 1.158 1.120 
 (0.079) (0.106) (0.091) 
Republican commissioner  0.987 0.973 
  (0.124) (0.121) 
Independent/other party   1.055 1.009 
 commissioner  (0.304) (0.288) 
Deregulation is active 0.562 0.534*  
 (0.202) (0.194)  
Deregulation is suspended 1.547 1.354  
 (0.968) (0.865)  
Per capita income, log 0.371* 0.598 1.103 
 (0.221) (0.192) (0.375) 
State pop, log 1.274*** 1.206** 1.198** 
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.095) 
Weibull shape parameter,  0.471*** 0.486*** 0.490*** 
Log (0.050) (0.049) (0.054) 
Likelihood -2051.5 -1937.5 -1946.5 

2
 stat (d.o.f.) and p-value 43.7 (9) 0.000 61.5 (15) 0.000 35.86 (14) 0.001 
Clusters (commissioners) 1,164 1,074 1,074 
 N  1,816 1,683 1,683 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
See notes to previous table. 
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Table 5:  Hazard Rate Estimation for Regents Leaving Mid-Term 
 
 Estimation D6  Estimation D7  
Y=time until regent is ousted exp() p-value exp() p-value 
Regressors of interest     
Appointed 3.711** 0.011 3.091*** 0.000 
Strong governor 27.407*** 0.000 5.149*** 0.000 
Revolving door restrictions 0.694 0.313 1.257 0.396 
Large board (> 8 regents) 0.447*** 0.006 0.621** 0.030 
Other control variables     
Per capita income, log 12.823* 0.068 15.678*** 0.004 
State pop, log 2.058** 0.039 0.961 0.640 
Weibull shape parameter, log 0.154* 0.053 0.153* 0.055 
Likelihood -929.6 -938.9 

2
 stat (d.o.f.) and p-value 28.49 (6) 0.000 56.03 (6) 0.000 
NERC region fixed effects yes no 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes:  Both estimations have 609 clusters (regents) and N=832.  Regents are included from the Alaska 
Board of Regents, the Regents of the University of California, The Trustees of Indiana University, the 
Regents of the University of Minnesota, Montana University System Board of Regents, University of 
Nebraska Board of Regents, the Ohio Board of Regents, The University of Texas System Board of Regents, 
the Utah System of Higher Education Board of Regents, and the University of Virginia Board of Visitors.  
See also notes to previous table. 
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Table 6:  Probit Estimation for Re-appointment or Re-election 
 Marginal effects × 100 (with std. errors in parentheses) 
Y = 1 if Re-appointed or  
re-elected, 0 if not 
Estimation 
R1 
Estimation 
R2 
Estimation  
R3 
Estimation 
R4 
Estimation  
R5 
Regressors of interest      
Res. electricity prices, log 27.392     
 (spline: bottom 5%) (26.144)     
Res. electricity prices, log -21.182**     
 (spline: top 95%) (8.403)     
Appointed  -14.18*** -11.04*** -12.13*** -21.44* 
  (3.95) (4.11) (4.19) (11.90) 
Citizen ideology x    -7.18** -7.12** -8.92* 
 Democrat   (3.56) (3.55) (4.77) 
Citizen ideology x    -2.30 -2.45 -6.57 
 Republican   (4.29) (4.30) (5.45) 
Commissioner and    7.31** 7.22** 6.10* 
 governor in same party   (3.31) (3.30) (3.23) 
Same governor as   17.20*** 16.03*** 16.32*** 14.76*** 
 previous term  (2.84) (3.09) (3.09) (3.11) 
Revolving door   -2.53 -0.95 -2.07 -10.33* 
 restrictions  (3.51) (3.71) (3.77) (5.62) 
Large PUC (> 4   3.78 5.70* 6.29* 11.08** 
 commissioners  (3.17) (3.27) (3.29) (4.56) 
Commissioner in majority    -0.82 -1.15 -0.58 
 party   (3.30) (3.30) (3.17) 
Commissioner salary, log    18.42**  
    (9.16)  
Other control variables      
Fuel input cost index, log 2.710* 1.40 1.26 1.61 1.97 
 (1.393) (1.28) (1.33) (1.35) (2.78) 
Republican commissioner   -1.51 -0.85 -3.12 
   (3.02) (3.05) (2.93) 
Independent/other party    -4.46 -4.60 -8.77 
 commissioner   (5.75) (5.75) (5.94) 
Deregulation is active 5.836 4.01 3.24 3.89 0.81 
 (6.634) (6.71) (6.76) (6.77) (6.76) 
Deregulation is  9.094 5.76 6.80 7.16 3.59 
 suspended (14.828) (16.13) (15.37) (15.51) (15.85) 
Per capita income, log -9.815 -6.04 -5.25 -18.86* -10.26 
 (7.740) (7.57) (7.91) (10.38) (8.37) 
State pop, log -4.333*** -5.45*** -5.83*** -7.68*** -17.85 
 (1.619) (1.71) (1.89) (2.06) (15.19) 
Likelihood -804.5 -779.0 -709.0 -707.1 -665.8 

2
 statistic (d.o.f.) and p-value 39.8 (7) 0.00 39.8 (7) 0.00 48.3 (13) 0.00 52.3 (14) 0.00 33.0 (13) 0.00 
Pseudo R squared 0.081 0.099 0.108 0.110 0.162 
N  1,263 1,247 1,147 1,147 1,147 
Clusters (commissioners)  848 840 772 772 772 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes:  Marginal effects are the change in the probability of serving a directly succeeding term from a one 
unit change in x (calculated as the average in the sample), expressed in percentage points.  Marginal effects 
are calculated with the derivative for continuous x and discrete changes for discrete x.  Robust standard 
errors for the marginal effects are in parentheses (clustered on commissioner).  Marginal effects for the 
spline in prices measure the slopes for the relevant interval in prices.  Two-way fixed effects for years and 
regions are included but not reported.  See previous table notes on 2 statistic. 
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Table 7:  Dynamic Panel Estimations for Electricity Prices 
 Coefficients × 100 (with std. errors in parentheses) 
Y = real residential electricity 
price, log 
Estimation  
P1 
Estimation  
P2 
Estimation  
P3 
Estimation 
P4 
Regressor of interest     
Past ousting -2.150** -0.789** -0.695** -3.273*** 
 (0.862) (0.314) (0.331) (0.661) 
Other control variables     
Lagged real residential  25.011*** 69.254*** 69.266*** 85.124*** 
 electricity price, log (6.486) (4.985) (5.039) (7.891) 
Appointed   0.214 1.197 
   (0.450) (1.033) 
Citizen ideology    0.194 -0.678 
   (1.365) (1.380) 
Governor Democrat    -0.266 -0.490 
    (0.466) (0.624) 
Governor independent   0.619 0.610 
    (0.503) (0.576) 
Revolving door    -1.438*** -2.191** 
 restrictions   (0.376) (0.846) 
Fuel input cost index,  6.263*** 2.078* 2.088* 1.468 
 log (real) (1.383) (1.160) (1.164) (1.014) 
Deregulation is active -12.343*** -3.723*** -3.500*** -3.583*** 
 (3.207) (1.113) (1.125) (1.121) 
Deregulation is  -14.280 -4.874 -4.626 -2.658 
 suspended (12.596) (4.163) (4.216) (4.335) 
Per capita income, log (real) -81.362*** -28.962*** -31.562*** -19.303*** 
 (12.593) (6.263) (5.646) (5.673) 
State pop, log 9.531*** 22.074*** 23.588*** 13.684*** 
 (2.191) (4.145) (3.769) (3.716) 
Fixed effects ERC region state state 
state & 3-
year groups 
Serial correlation none 2 lags 2 lags 2 lags 
Treatment of ousting exogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous 
R
2
 0.604    
F or 
2
 statistic (d.o.f.) 34.7 (7,50) 2,589.5 (7) 2,143.6 (12) 5,155.1 (12) 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen overID stat. (d.o.f.)  5.09 (4) 3.90 (4) 3.38 (4) 
p-value  0.278 0.419 0.496 
N  1,730 1,730 1,696 1,696 
Number of instruments  11 16 27 
Clusters for SE’s  51 51 50 50 
Notes: An observation is for a state in a year.  The first test statistic is F for estimation P1 and χ2 for the 
others; the latter excludes coefficients for year fixed effects in estimation P4. P-values are for the statistic 
in the row above.  The second test statistic is Hansen‘s statistic with null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid in the GMM estimations.  A constant is included in P1.  Std. errors are robust to 
clustering at the state level.  Real variables are deflated with the CPI-U. 
